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The New World Order and
the Right of Self-Defense in
the United Nations Charter
By KATHRYN S. ELLIOTT*
Member of the Class of 1992
In recent years, world leaders have publicly embraced the United
Nations as the forum for resolution of international conflicts and the ve-
hicle for a new world order.' After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
President George Bush reaffirmed the United States commitment to the
United Nations and used the Security Council to elicit worldwide opposi-
tion to Iraq.2 Similarly, in response to the Iraqi invasion, Soviet Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadze noted the opportunity for the United Na-
* A.B., Princeton University, 1988. The author wishes to thank Howard Elliott, Jr.,
Susan Elliott, and Hugh Burns for their comments on earlier drafts of this Note.
1. In 1987 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev praised the United Nations as "a place
for the mutual search for a balance of differing, contradictory, yet real, interests of the contem-
porary community of states and nations." Thomas M. Franck, Soviet Initiatives U.S Re-
sponses - New Opportunities for Reviving the United Nations System, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 531,
535-36 (1989).
Upon his inauguration in 1989, President George Bush also expressed strong support for
the United Nations. At the January 24, 1989, White House briefing, Press Secretary Marlin
Fitzwater announced: "The President strongly supports the efforts of the Secretary General to
make the United Nations a more effective problem-solving institution." Marlin Fitzwater,
Briefing at the White House (Jan. 24, 1989), in Federal News Service, Jan. 24, 1989, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File.
At the Swearing-in ceremony for the United States ambassador to the United Nations,
President Bush stated, "I take the United Nations very seriously and I'm pleased with the
changes that have been taking place there." George Bush, Remarks At Swearing In Ceremony
of Thomas Pickering As U.S. Embassador At the United Nations (Mar. 20, 1989), in Federal
News Service, Mar. 20, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File [hereinafter
Bush Remarks].
2. President George Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly concerning
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on October 1, 1990; he stated:
The founding of the United Nations embodied our deepest hopes for a peaceful
world. And during the past year, we've come closer than ever before to realizing
those hopes.... Not since 1945 have we seen the real possibility of using the United
Nations as it was designed, as a center for international collective security.
George Bush, Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 1, 1990), in N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 1990, at A6.
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tions to enhance its prestige and gain new experience.3 A statement to
the Security Council by Douglas Hurd, the British Secretary of State,
exemplified the sentiments of world leaders: "On the debris of the Iron
Curtain we are now building a new and better international order....
[W]e must continue that effort. We must entrench that new world order
if our children are to be spared the bloodshed which have [sic] scarred
the history of this century."'
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, however, the United States and
Great Britain may actually have undermined the United Nations promis-
ing position in the new world order. While publicly embracing the
United Nations, both countries insisted that they had justification for
taking independent action5 against Iraq.6 Basing their claim on Kuwait's
right of self-defense,7 the United States and Great Britain stated that they
did not need Security Council authorization to begin either the naval
interdiction or the use of force against Iraq.8
This Note argues that the United States and Great Britain inter-
preted the right of self-defense incorrectly. The right to self-defense, as
provided in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, is limited. Part I
of the Note discusses both the history of the United Nations and the
statements by the United States and Great Britain concerning Kuwait's
right of self-defense. Part II interprets Article 51 by exploring its text,
3. On September 25, 1990, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations: "These days are a trying time for our organization. If it
passes this test it will immeasurably enhance its prestige, gain new experience and new capabil-
ities." Eduard Shevardnadze, Address Before the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 25,
1990), in N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1990, at A10.
4. Douglas Hurd, Address Before the United Nations Security Council (Sept. 25, 1990),
in Federal News Service, Sept. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File *1-2.
Sir Crispin Tickell, the British representative to the United Nations, echoed Hurd's com-
ments. He said that the United Nations had faced its responsibilitis and now must succeed
where the League of Nations failed and the Security Council itself had faltered in the past.
Cold War's End Pays Off in UN Votes, CHi. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1990, at C20.
5. "Independent action" in this Note refers to action taken without authorization by the
Security Council.
6. United States Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated in Paris, in October 1990:
"Given the request by the government of Kuwait under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter-the
inherent right of self-defense-we do not require any additional authority [to attack Iraq]."
John M. Broder, Crisis In the Persian Gulf, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at A6.
Similarly, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told the House of Commons on September
6, 1990: "[VMe are not precluded by reason of any of the Security Council resolutions from
exercising the inherent right of collective self-defense. . . ." Margaret Thatcher, Remarks
Before the Emergency Session of the British House of Commons Concerning the Iraqi Inva-
sion of Kuwait (Sept. 6, 1990) in Federal News Service, Sept. 6, 1')90, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Thatcher Remarks].
7. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
8. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
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the intent of its drafters, and the policy ramifications of alternate inter-
pretations. Part Ill concludes that the right of self-defense may be exer-
cised only until the Security Council has taken the measures that it
deems necessary to restore international peace.
I. THE UNITED NATIONS
The United Nations represents an international attempt to create a
new world order after World War II. The "Big Four" powers, namely
China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, united to
formulate a scheme for converting their wartime alliance into a perma-
nent collective security organization. 9 After several preliminary meet-
ings, representatives of the Big Four met twice during the fall of 1944 at
Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., and agreed upon a basic plan for
the organization.' 0 A number of important issues, however, such as the
voting procedures in the Security Council, remained in question follow-
ing the Dumbarton Oaks meetings."1 These issues were resolved by Pres-
ident Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
Premier Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference in 1945.12
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, as modified at Yalta, formed the
basis for negotiations at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization which convened in San Francisco on April 25, 1945.13 The
United Nations Charter, adopted at the San Francisco Conference, ex-
pressed the common hope for world peace and created a machinery for
its maintenance.'
4
The Charter established four principal instruments: the Security
Council for the resolution of international conflicts and the enforcement
of peace; the General Assembly as a forum for discussion and debate; the
Economic and Social Council as an institute for discussion of common
problems among nations; and the International Court of Justice to hear
9. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDWARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 4-5 (1946).
10. Id. at 6-7.
11. U.N. DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS at 8, U.N.
Sales No. E.85.I.24 (1986) [hereinafter EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS]. For more detail on
the voting procedure, see infra note 34.
12. Id at 8; R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: TIlE ROLE
OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-45, at 4-5 (1958).
13. RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 5.
14. SECRETARY OF STATE, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION, THE SECRETARY OF STATE 11-12 (Comm. Print 1969) [here-
inafter REPORT].
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justiciable controversies.15 Edward Stettinius, Jr., President Roosevelt's
Secretary of State, wrote: "These four overall instruments constitute the
principal means by which the Charter proposes to translate the world's
hope for peace and security into the beginning of a world practice of
peace and security." 16 The drafters and participating nations recognized
that they were defining a new world order. 7
The basic principle underlying the United Nations is the prohibition
of the use or threat of aggression.18 The Charter explicitly mandates:
"All members shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state."19
The Charter provides one exception to this prohibition. Force may
be used in self-defense under the circumstances described in Article 51.
The Article states, in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed at-
tack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security."2 This provision "merely recognizes that the old world
system may still be needed until the new system of global policing can
secure peace for all."'" Article 51 also legitimizes agreements and trea-
ties for collective self-defense.22
Under the Charter, the Security Council is the locus of dispute reso-
lution,23 having "primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
15. Id. at 14-16.
16. Id. at 16.
17. The debates on ratification of the United Nations Charter in the United States Senate
also evidence an awareness of creating a new world order. Thomas Franck & Faiza Patel,
Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 66-
70 (citing 91 Cong. Rec. 58020, 8030 (1945)).
18. See generally Edward Gordon, Article 2(4) in Historical Context, 10 YALE J. INT'L L.
271, 274-75 (1985); Eugene Rostow, The Legality of the International Use of Force by and from
States, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 286, 289 (1985); Oscar Schachter, International Law: The Right of
States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620 (1984); Eric Stein, The United Nations and
the Enforcement of Peace, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 304, 305 (1989).
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, S4.
20. Id. art. 51.
Article 53 of the Charter is often cited in tandem with Article 51 when a nation is seeking
to justify taking military action, especially when the action grows out of a regional defense
agreement. Article 53 reads, in part: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of
the Security Council.... ." Id. art. 53, 11.
21. Franck & Patel, supra note 17, at 63.
22. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
23. The Security Council is composed of five permanent members (China, France, Great
Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States) and ten non-permanent members. The non-
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tional peace and security.",2 4 The Council may call on parties to any
dispute to "seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilia-
tion, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or ar-
rangements, or other peaceful means."25 The Council may also make
recommendations or decide what measures are necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. 6 If the Council identifies a
threat to the peace or an act of aggression, it may take enforcement
measures to give effect to its decisions. These enforcement measures may
include economic sanctions, embargo, and severance of diplomatic rela-
tions.2' If the enforcement measures are inadequate, the Security Coun-
cil is empowered to call for a collective police action to restore peace .2
Despite the Charter's powerful language, political division during
the Cold War years substantially debilitated the effectiveness of the Se-
curity Council.29 While the Security Council was able to establish peace-
keeping arrangements, these arrangements were ancillary to the function
of the Security Council as envisioned by the drafters of the Charter.' As
a consequence, the Security Council did not serve as the forum for
resolving international conflicts. In 1955, a Senate Committee faulted
"the attitude of the Soviet Union." 31 For example, the United States use
of force under the auspices of the United Nations in the Korean War was
only possible because the Soviet Union was absent from Security Council
permanent members are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. EVERYONE'S
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 11, at 16-17.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, 1.
25. Id art. 33.
26. Id art. 39.
27. IdL art. 41.
Economic sanctions have only been implemented three times: the 1977 arms embargo
against South Africa, which began as voluntary sanctions in 1963; the 1966-1977 economic
sanctions against Rhodesia; the 1990 naval blockade of Iraq. EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS,
supra note 11, at 80; Stein, supra note 18, at 307.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
Until the Iraqi invasion, the Security Council had not employed its authority to mobilize a
United Nations fighting force since the Korean War. Stein, supra note 18, at 311.
29. See, eg., Stein, supra note 18, at 306-07.
30. Id at 311.
For detailed information on United Nations peace-keeping forces, see U.N. DEPT OF
PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE BLUE HELMETS: A REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEP-
ING, U.N. Sales No. E.90.I.18 (1990); Xu Xiao-Bing, The Role of the Security Council in Re-
spect of Peacekeeping Operations, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD PEACE 101 (Shreesh
Juyal & B. Ramesh Babu eds., 1990).
31. S. Doc. No. 164, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1955), reprinted in REVIEW OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER: COMPILATION OF STAFF STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE USE or THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS 199 (1970) [hereinafter REVIEW].
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meetings in protest of Taiwan's representation of China at the United
Nations. 2 Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was not solely responsible for
the Security Council's ineffectiveness.
From the United Nations inception, the United States and the So-
viet Union often exercised their veto powers, thus serving to stalemate
the Security Council.3" Under the Charter, the five permanent members
of the Security Council (China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
and the United States) have an absolute veto power over any substantive
matter.34 The use of this veto power prevented the Security Council
from passing many resolutions. For example, during the Arab-Israeli
conflict, the Security Council could not pass sanctions resolutions despite
repeated threats to do so. Consequently, the threats lost all deterrent
effect.35 The veto power has also been used by the United States to avoid
its responsibilities in the international legal community. In 1984, the In-
ternational Court of Justice decided that the United States owed Nicara-
gua reparations because of the Central Intelligence Agency's mining of
Nicaraguan harbors.36 The United States responded by declaring that
the International Court of Justice did not have jurisdiction. The United
States reasoned that the case was an ongoing political matter to be re-
solved in the Security Council - the forum in which the United States
was able to exercise its absolute veto.37
32. Id.; EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 11, at 52.
33. In 1989, Eric Stein, of the University of Michigan Law School, described the Soviet
Union's attitude toward the United Nations at the San Francisco Conference in 1945:
The Soviet Union has viewed the United Nations as an institutional superstructure
controUed by inherently hostile forces. It has been the Soviet policy to block any
move that could in the remotest way interfere with the consolidation and expansion
of its empire, but to support any action elsewhere that would conform to its national
and party policy. The most disheartening feature of the early Soviet behavior in the
Council was its use of the veto not only against proposals which it opposed, but also
against resolutions which in its view "did not go far enough." Such an attitude obvi-
ously made any compromise impossible and any differences irreconcilable.
Stein, supra note 18, at 306.
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 27.
Each member of the Security Council has one vote. Decisions on non-procedural matters
require nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five permanent members. Decisions on
procedural matters require the approval of any nine members. EVERYONE'S UNITED NA-
TIONS, supra note 11, at 16-17; see also REVIEW, supra note 31, at 7-11.
35. Stein, supra note 18, at 313-14; See generally Alfred J. Hctz, Legal Dilemmas: The
Arab-Israel Conflict, 19 S.D. L. REv. 242 (1974).
36. Joel Achenbach, "New World Order" What's It Mean, Anyway?, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,
1991, at Dl.
37. Id.
The draft resolution condemned the mining of Nicaragua's ports and called for an end to
the mining. The draft was not adopted because of a negative vote cast by the United States.
EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 11, at 48.
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Ultimately, the Cold War and the deadlock in the Security Council
created an environment where nations liberally construed Article 51 in
order to bolster their own agendas. There was a proliferation of regional
security pacts in response to the perception that the United Nations
could not provide adequate defense against aggression.38 Some of these
agreements refer specifically to Article 51, and all are based on the con-
cept of collective self-defense.39 These pacts include: the Arab League
(1945), the Rio Treaty (1947), the NATO Treaty (1949), the Anzus
Treaty (1951). the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (1954), and
the Warsaw Pact (1955).' During the Cold War, these pacts were
viewed as more effective guarantees of security than the United Nations
Charter.41 Additionally, various nations cited the right of self-defense in
Article 51 to legitimize the unilateral use of force. For example, the
United States has claimed that its participation in the Vietnam War, in-
vasion of Grenada, support of the Contras in Nicaragua, and interven-
tion in Panama were justified under the right of self-defense.42 Even the
Korean War has been described by some commentators as a collective
38. REVIEw, supra note 31, at 204; Stein, supra note 18, at 307-08.
39. REVIEW, supra note 31, at 203-08; Stein, supra note 18, at 307-08.
40. REPORT, supra note 14, at 107; REVIEw, supra note 31, at 204.
41. NORMAN BENTWICH & ANDREW MARTIN, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHARTER OF
THE UNrrED NATIONS xxvii (1969).
42. During the Vietnam War, the United States sent troops in response to a request from
South Vietnam. Thus, the United States claimed its action was justified on the basis of collec-
tive self-defense. Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. . INT'L
L. 645, 647 (1984).
United States Troops invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983. On the day of the invasion,
Saint Lucia transmitted a statement to the Security Council from the Organization of Eastern
Carribean States (the OECS) informing the Council that the United States, Jamaica, and Bar-
bados had responded to Grenada's request for help from the OECS. They formed a multina-
tional force to undertake a pre-emptive defensive strike "in order to remove this dangerous
threat to peace and security" in the region. The action was condemned by many countries, but
the Security Council resolution was vetoed by the United States. EVERYONE'S UNrTED NA-
TIONS, supra note 11, at 42-43. See also Christopher C. Joyner, The United States Action in
Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness ofInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); Schachter,
supra note 18, at 1640-41. But see Rostow, supra note 18, at 289 (arguing that the United
States action was "entirely justified under Article 51"). For a detailed discussion of the inva-
sion, see John N. Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L
145 (1984).
During the 1980s, the United States supported the efforts of the Contras to overthrow the
Sandinista government of Nicaragua. In what became known as the "Reagan Doctrine," the
United States asserted that it had the right to support national liberation movements based on
the right of collective self-defense. Anthony Day, U.S. Cozies up to Law of Nations, LA.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at Al. See also EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 11, at 47-
49; John Fagot Aviel, Nicaragua and The United Nations in THE UNITED NATIONS AND
WORLD PEACE, supra note 30, at 194; Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, The United States, and the
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self-defensive action blessed by the Security Council.43 Similarly, in
1982, Great Britain, invoking Article 51, initiated coercive measures and
ultimately invaded the Falkland Islands."
In sum, from 1945 to 1990, the Security Council's dispute resolution
mechanisms did not operate as envisioned. In 1984, Professor Oscar
Schachter of Columbia University Law School described the ineffective-
ness of the Charter provisions on collective police actions as follows:
These provisions were seen by most observers as the heart of the Char-
ter and the most important principles of contemporary international
law.... Yet, as we are all acutely aware, there is widespread cynicism
about their effect. Reality seems to mock them. Wars take place,
countries are invaded, armed force is used to topple governments, to
seize territory, to avenge past injustice, to impose settlements.... Col-
lective security, as envisaged in the Charter, has had little practical
effect.
45
In the late 1980s, however, both the Soviet Union and the United
States appeared to recommit to the United Nations. The first indication
of the new Soviet attitude came in September 1987. Soviet President
Gorbachev embraced the United Nations as "a place for the mutual
search for a balance of differing, contradictory, yet real, interests of the
World Court, 85 COLUM. L. Rv. 1445 (1985). But see Rostow, supra note 18, at 289 (arguing
that involvement was justified under Article 51).
President Bush ordered military forces to invade Panama on )ecember 20, 1989. Secre-
tary of State Baker claimed that the actions were "fully in accordance with international law."
Excerpts From Statement by Baker on U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1989, at A19. How-
ever, several commentators disagreed, arguing that the right to self-defense in the United Na-
tions and OAS charters is limited to when there is an actual threat, not some "rhetorical threat
by a military leader or some incident in which an American citizen is harmed abroad." Susan
F. Rasky, Fighting in Panama: Legal Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1989, at A22. See also
Achenbach, supra note 36; Ved P. Nanda, U.S. Forces in Panama: Defenders, Aggressors or
Human Rights Activists?: The Validity of the United States Intervention in Panama under Inter-
national Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990) (questioning whether the invasion was justified
under Article 51, the OAS right of self-defense, or principles of international law, He con-
cluded that the invasion was not justified on any of the following bases: humanitarian intervcn-
tion, protection of democracy, integrity of the canal treaties, or apprehension of Noriega.).
43. Stein, supra note 18, at 309.
44. Argentine forces invaded the Falkland Islands on April 2, 1982. The next day, the
Security Council passed Resolution 502 which demanded an immediate withdrawal of Argen-
tine forces and called for negotiations between the Argentine and British governments. Imme-
diately thereafter, the British government began exerting economic and diplomatic pressure oil
Argentina. Domingo E. Acevedo, The U.S. Measures Against Argentina Resulting from the
Malvinas Conflict, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 323 (1984). See also Nicholas Watkins, Disputed Sover-
eignty in the Falkland Islands: The Argentine-Great Britain Conflict of 1982, 11 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 649 (1983) (arguing that Great Britain could validly invoke article 51).
45. Schachter, supra note 18, at 1620.
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contemporary community of states and nations."'" The Soviet Union
joined the United States in mediating the end to both the Iran-Iraq War
in 1987 and the South African occupation of Namibia in 1988.47 In both
conflicts, the United Nations played a pivotal role.48 Symbolizing the
United States new posture, President Bush invited United Nations Secre-
tary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to be his first formal foreign guest at
the White House.49 More significantly, rather than selecting a political
cohort as United Nations Ambassador, Bush appointed Thomas Picker-
ing, who has been described as "one of the brightest stars of the Foreign
Service establishment." 5
Nonetheless, the United States' embrace of the United Nations ap-
peared less sincere after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Great Britain
seemed similarly disingenuous. Citing Article 51, both nations insisted
that they had the right to take action independent of the United Nations.
On August 12, 1990, President Bush ordered United States naval
forces to interdict shipping headed for Iraq or Kuwait." By that time
the Security Council had already passed three resolutions condemning
the invasion and imposing sanctions."2 None of these resolutions, how-
ever, had called for naval interdiction in support of the sanctions. Presi-
dent Bush cited Article 51 as providing the United States with the legal
right to enforce the sanctions.5 3 It was not until two weeks later that the
46. Franck, supra note 1, at 535.
47. Id.
48. For detailed information on the Soviet Union's attitude, see id.; see also Stein, supra
note 18, at 315.
49. Franck, supra note 1, at 533. According to an article in The New York Times, United
Nations officials and diplomats were excited by the news of the invitation to de Cuellar. They
said that it showed that Mr. Bush wanted to develop a more constructive relationship with the
United Nations than the Reagan administration had during most of its time in office. Transi-
tion to Washington: Bush to Meet U.N. Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jam 19, 1989, at BI I.
50. Franek, supra note 1, at 535. See also Bush Remarks, supra note 1.
51. Marjorie A. Brown, Iraq-Kuwai" The United Nations Response, Cong. Res. Service
No. 1B90147, at 7 (1990).
The United States naval interdiction began on August 16, 1991. Michael R. Gordon,
Navy Begins Blockade Enforcing Iraq Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1990, at Al.
52. On August 2, 1990, Resolution 660 condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded im-
mediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/Res./660
(1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 1990.
On August 6, 1990, Resolution 661 imposed mandatory sanctions on Iraq. S.C. Res. 661,
U.N. Doc. S/Res./661 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council 1990.
On August 9, 1990, the annexation of Kuwait was declared invalid in Resolution 662.
S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doc. S/Res./662 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Reso-
lutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1990.
53. According to the White House, the interdiction was instituted in response to a request
1991]
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Security Council authorized naval interdiction.54 Moreover, throughout
the fall of 1990, the United States continued to cite Kuwait's right of self-
defense as justification for the independent use of force.5 5 In fact, the
United States continued to insist that it had the right to take independent
action until this claim was made moot by the passage of Resolution 678,
which authorized the use of force, on November 27, 1990.56
Great Britain, like the United States, relied on Article 51 through-
out the fall of 1990 to claim that it had the authority to fight Iraq without
approval from the United Nations. Prime Minister Thatcher stated that
from the exiled Kuwaiti government that the United States take action "to ensure that the
U.N.-mandated economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait [were] immediately and effec-
tively implemented." Transcript of U.S. Statement About Measures.4gainst Iraq, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 13, 1990, at Al 1. See also R. P. Apple, Jr., Ships Turn Awayfiom Posts as Iraq Embargo
Tightens: U.S. Military Force Pours In, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1990, at Al; Michael R. Gordon,
Bush Orders Navy to Halt All Shipments of Iraqs Oil and Almost All Its Imports, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1990, at Al; Fred Strasser, Iraq Clash Tests New Alliances, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 3, 1990,
at I.
54. Resolution 665 was passed on August 25, 1990. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doc. S/Res./665
(1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 1990.
55. In November 1990, President Bush was asked by a reporter: "Do you feel that you are
free to take offensive action without any kind of U.N. resolution authorizing it?" Bush replied,
"Yes. We have the authority.. . ." Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: The Logic of War, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1990, at A19.
Similarly, a Senior State Department official stated: "Legally our position and the position
shared by others is that Article 51 provides a sufficient basis under international law for fur-
ther action." But he added that a Security Council resolution "would provide a firmer polit-
ical basis." Thomas L. Friedman, Allies Tell Baker Any Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Must Be Approved by U.N., N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1990, at A14.
See also Persian Gulf Crisis: Hearing of the House Armed Services Committee (Dec, 19,
1990), in Federal News Service, Dec. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew
File (Jeanne Kirkpatrick, former United Nations Ambassador testifying, "I don't think we
needed to go to the UN to seek that authorization to use force against the invasion of Kuwait,
in any case, since Article 51 of the UN Charter provides for all member states the right of self-
defense and collective defense. And we, of course, responded to an appeal by Kuwait against
armed invasion."); Broder, supra note 6 (quoting Defense Secretary Chancy's statement that
the United States did not need authority beyond Article 51 for attacking Iraq); John M.
Goshko, Experts: Action Fits U.N. Terms, WASH. PosT, Aug 14, 1990, at A17 (interviewing
Professor John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia and John Lawrence Hargrove of
the American Society of International Law who both stated that the United States unilateral
action was based on a correct interpretation of Article 51).
56. Resolution 678 authorized member states to "use all necessary means" to implement
Resolution 660 if Iraq had not complied with resolution 660 by Jan, 15, 1991. S.C. Res. 678,
U.N. Doc. S/Res./678 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and
Decisions of the Security Council 1990.
Approval of Resolution 678 marked only the second time in history that the United Na-
tions approved the use of force. The first was the series of resolutions in 1950 that launched
the Korean War. Paul Lewis, U.S. is Reported to Win Support for Use of Force, N.Y. TIIEs,
Nov. 26, 1990, at Al.
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her country had full legal authority to act against Iraq based on the Emir
of Kuwait's request for help. 7 Other world leaders took more equivocal
positions.58
Although the Security Council passed twelve resolutions condemn-
ing Iraq and ultimately authorized the use of force to liberate Kuwait,5 9
57. Thatcher Remarks, supra note 6 ('[W]e are not precluded by reason of any or the
Security Council resolutions from exercising the inherent right of collective self-defense in
accordance with the rules of international law."); Glen Frankel, British Gulf Role Wins Broad
Backing, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1990, at A25 (Thatcher insisted that the United States and
Britain could justifiably launch a military strike against Iraq without needing to return to the
Security Council for approval.); Paul Lewis, U.N. Sponsorship of a War in the Gulf is No
Simple Matter, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1990, at E3 ("The United States, Great Britain and
France, which have the largest military deployments in the gull, used to claim that they al-
ready had all the authority they needed to fight President Saddam Hussein - Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter, which says one member can ask others for help against aggression.
But recent developments are pushing Washington to seek the Security Council's explicit bless-
ing .. "); Thatcher Says West has Authority For Action Against Iraq, The Reuter Library
Report, Oct. 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt File C" 'We already have full
legal authority under [United Nations] Article 51 and by request of the Emir of Kuwait,'
Thatcher said in response to a parliamentary question."). See also Maureen Dowd, Bush, At
U.N., Sees Hope in Diplomacy in the Gulf Crisis, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2, 1990, at Al.
58. France indicated, in August 1990, that it preferred to have the Security Council deter-
mine how force was applied rather than having the United States and Britain take independent
action based on Article 51. Enforcing the Embargo, WASH. PosT, Aug. 15, 1990, at A20. In
November President Mitterrand stated that he told President Bush that the nations ought to
adopt "a new resolution within the Security Council which would authorize the eventual use of
force." Dave Lauter, Bush Set for Turkey in Desert: Assad Meeting, LA. TIMEs, Nov. 22,
1990, at Al.
The Soviet Union seemed to prefer to use the Security Council forum, but it did not
unequivocally reject the use of Article 51. At a joint news conference with a United States
official, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovski declined to say "if the Soviet
Union felt that Article 51 gave the allied troops the right to engage in military action without
U.N. approval." But he implied that "he favored activating Article 42 should military force be
deemed necessary." U.S., Soviet Union Explore U.N. Command for Gulf Forces, UPI, Oct. 4,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. On November 8, 1990, Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze told Secretary of State Baker that any military action should be sanc-
tioned by the Security Council. Thomas Friedman, Moscow Refuses to Rule Out Force.' So viets
Shift Their Position, but Assert the U.N. Must Authorize Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990,
at A13.
The Secretary General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, indicated, in No-
vember 1990, that Article 51's validity had expired in the three months since Iraq had invaded
Kuwait. U.N. Article 51 May Not Permit Strike at Iraq, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1990, at A30.
See also Leonard Doyle & Colin Brown, Crisis in the Guf. Perez de Cuellar Unconvinced by
Thatcher, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 9, 1990, at 10; Anthony Lewis, U.N. Chief Argues Block-
ade Is Hasty, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 17 1990, at A12.
59. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/Res./660 (1990), supra note 52 (condemning invasion and
demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doec. S/Res./661
(1990), supra note 52 (imposing mandatory sanctions on Iraq); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. Doec. S/
Res./662 (1990), supra note 52 (declaring annexation of Kuwait invalid); S.C. Res. 664, U.N.
Doc. S/Res./664 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and Decisions
of the Security Council 1990 (demanding safe departure of third country nationals and calling
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the invasion raised the issue of whether the United States, Great Britain,
or any other nation, could take independent action without violating the
Charter once the Security Council had passed resolutions concerning the
Iraqi invasion.
II. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 51
While the United Nations Charter makes no provision for its own
interpretation,' Article 51 can reasonably be interpreted by analysis of
(1) the language of the text, (2) the intent of its drafters, and (3) the
policy ramifications of alternative interpretations.
A. The Text of Article 51
Article 51 provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed at-
tack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. .61 Article 51 requires member nations to report the
exercise of this right to the Security Council immediately.62 Article 51
for recision of orders to close diplomatic and consular missions); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doe. S/
Res./665 (1990), supra note 54 (calling for naval interdiction to halt maritime shipping); S.C.
Res. 666, U.N. Doc. S/Res./666 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions
and Decisions of the Security Council 1990 (calling for review of food supply and states that
Res. 661 did not apply to medical supplies); S.C. Res. 667, U.N. Doc. S/Res./667 (1990), to be
reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1990
(condemning actions against diplomatic missions); S.C. Res. 669, U.N. Doc. S/Res./669
(1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 1990 (allowing requests for assistance under Article 50); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. Doc. S1
Res./670 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the
Security Council 1990 (deciding that sanctions include all means of transport, including air-
craft); S.C. Res. 674, U.N. Doe. S/Res./674 (1990), to be reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year,
Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1990 (demanding that Iraq stop taking
hostages and mistreating Kuwaitis); S.C. Res. 677, U.N. Doc. S/Res./667 (1990), to be re-
printed in U.N. SCOR, 45th Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1990
(condemning attempts by Iraq to change demographic composition of Kuwait and to destroy
its civil records); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/Res./678 (1990), supra note 56 (authorizing
member states to "use all necessary means" to implement Res. 660 if Iraq has not complied by
Jan. 15, 1991).
60. The advisory opinions, issued by the International Court of Justice, interpreting the
Charter have no binding effect. The members of the United Nations, in practice, are free to
interpret the Charter in accordance with their own discretion. REVI EW, supra note 31, at 45.
Schachter cites two reasons for the absence of an authoritative body to decide between
conflicting positions regarding the validity of the use of force: the International Court of Jus-
tice lacks compulsory jurisdiction, and the Security Council is often unable to exercise its
authority because of the veto. Schachter, supra note 18, at 1621-22.
61. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
62. Id.
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also states that the right of self-defense does not affect the authority of
the Security Council to take action.63
There has been much scholarly debate regarding the meanings of the
words and phrases in Article 51.64 Nonetheless, the meanings of the
phrases that are significant to this Note are clear.
The plain meaning of the clause, "until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary," limits the right of self-defense. "Until" is a
word of limitation which is used to restrict the phrase which precedes it
(i.e., the right of self-defense) to the phrase which immediately follows it
(i.e., Security Council action).65 Accordingly, the Article is not an af-
firmative grant of the right of self-defense. 66 Instead, it is a statement of
the context in which an exercise of the right is not precluded. 67 Thus, the
text of Article 51 dictates that the right of self-defense is limited and
cannot be exercised after the Security Council takes the "measures neces-
63. Id
64. The meanings of several phrases in Article 51 are ambiguous. The text is facially
unclear with regard to the meaning of "inherent right," "collective self-defense," and "armed
attack."
The extent of the "inherent right" may be discernable by examining the development of
international law. Under international law, before the Charter was adopted the right of self-
defense was judged by Secretary Webster's standard in the Caroline case: the necessity of force
was required to be "instant and overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment
for deliberation." The Caroline standard did not preclude preventive armed attacks in self-
defense. Article 51 while referring to the right as "inherent," however, imposes a new crite-
rion-the prior happening of an armed attack. Gordon, supra note 18, at 277-78.
The word "collective" also has given rise to controversy among legal scholars. The nar-
row view regards self-defense as only an individual right. Therefore, collective self-defense
would only apply to situations where multiple nations act in concert for defense when each has
been attacked. Schachter, supra note 18, at 1638. However, in treaties and declarations, many
nations have adopted the liberal view of collective self-defense as allowing armed action by any
member of an alliance when another member is attacked. let at 1639. Both the Nato Treaty
and the Warsaw Pact provide that an attack on one would be considered an attack against
them all, and consequently, that attack would justify action by all in accordance with Article
51. Id
Finally, scholars have debated whether self-defense requires an armed attack or whether it
is permissible in anticipation of an attack. One reading is that self-defense is limited to cases or
armed attack. Ii at 1631; Rex J. Zedalis, Some Thoughts on the United Nations Charter and
the Use of Military Force Against Economic Coercion, 17 TuLsA LJ. 487 (1982) (arguing that
states may not immediately resort to the use of force in self-defense against economic coer-
cion). An alternative reading holds that since Article 51 is silent as to the definition of the
right of self-defense it should not be construed to eliminate the right to defend against
threatened attack, a right which was valid under customary law. However, Schachter notes
that this reading would make the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" redundant. Schachter,
supra note 18, at 1633.
65. BLACK'S LAW DIcTiONARY 1380 (5th ed. 1979).
66. Abram Chayes, The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf, Address at the U.S.-Soiet
Conference on the Non-Use of Force, at 7 (Oct. 4, 5, and 6, 1990).
67. Id.
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sary to maintain international peace and security. 6
Nonetheless, because the Charter does not explicitly define "meas-
ures necessary," it is not facially clear at what point Article 51 limits a
nation's right of self-defense. If "measures necessary" is interpreted ex-
pansively to include even the call for a Security Council meeting to dis-
cuss a conflict, then a nation's right of self-defense would be cut off
quickly. At the other extreme, if "measures necessary" is read very nar-
rowly to mean only Security Council actions which actually end a con-
flict, then a nation would have a virtually unlimited right to take
independent action at any time during a conflict.
Article 39 indicates that "measures necessary" means whatever
measures the Security Council selects.69 Article 39 is the first Article in
chapter VII of the Charter, which includes Article 41 (allowing eco-
nomic sanctions, embargo, and severance of diplomatic relations), Arti-
cle 42 (allowing collective police action) and Article 51.0 Article 39
empowers the Security Council to "decide what measures shall be taken
in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security."71 According to the Charter, therefore, it is
the province of the Security Council to determine what types of measures
are necessary to restore international peace and security.72 These meas-
ures may include any of the actions listed in Articles 41 and 42, such as
economic sanctions, embargo, severance of diploma-tic relations, or col-
lective police action. Thus, if the Security Council passes a resolution
calling for an embargo, the Council has expressed its determination of
the measure necessary for the restoration of international peace. At that
point, no nation is free to take other action independent of the United
Nations.
Under this interpretation of "measures necessary," a nation may
take independent action in at least three situations based on the Security
Council's failure to take the measures necessary to restore international
peace and security. First, a nation may act in self-defense before the Se-
curity Council has determined the measures necessary to restore peace.
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
69. Id. art. 39.
70. Chapter VII is entitled "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression." The chapter encompasses Articles 39 through 51. Id cli,
VII.
71. Id. art. 39.
72. Chayes, supra note 66, at 8-10.
By comparing the language used throughout the Charter with the language of Article 51,
Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard Law School concludes that it is the function of the Secur-
ity Council to judge what constitutes the measures necessary. Id. at 8-9.
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Second, as Professor Abram Chayes of Harvard Law School suggests, a
nation could exercise the right of self-defense when the Security Council
is debating a situation "with no likelihood of a serious substantive out-
come."'7 As an example, he states that when the Security Council was
immobilized by reciprocal vetoes during the Cold War, "a state acting in
individual or collective self-defense could not be expected to forego con-
tinuing action simply because the Council was debating the situation"
with no prospect for passage of a resolution.74 Similarly, Professor
Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel of New York University School of Law
argue that the right of self-defense, suspended by a collective police ac-
tion, might revive if the Council became blocked from taking necessary
measures." Third, Professor Chayes proposes that a nation's right of
self-defense might not be limited when the Security Council's action is
"plainly incommensurate with the seriousness of the situation." 76 Thus,
when the Security Council is functioning properly and when it has de-
cided on a course of action, it will be a very rare situation indeed where a
nation may act independently based on the Security Council's failure to
take the measures necessary.
In conclusion, a reasonable reading of the text of Article 51 indi-
cates that the right of self-defense is limited. With rare exceptions, the
right may be exercised only until the Security Council takes the action
which it determines is necessary.
B. The Intent of the Drafters
The drafters of the Charter intended it to permit self-defensive ac-
tion only "before the machinery of the Organization [could] be brought
into action."'77 The intent to permit a very limited right of self-defense is
evident in (1) the overall purpose of the Charter, (2) the purpose of Arti-
cle 51, and (3) the evolution of the text of the article at the San Francisco
Conference.
1. The Purpose of the Charter
An expansive right of self-defense is inconsistent with the purpose of
the Charter as a whole. The delegates to the San Francisco Conference
drafted the Charter with the idea that they were creating a new world
order, leaving behind the terrible loss of lives and destruction of property
73. Id at 9.
74. Iad
75. Franck & Patel, supra note 17, at 3.
76. Chayes, supra note 66, at 9.
77. REPORT, supra note 14, at 41.
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of World War H1.78 Welcoming the delegates to the conference, Presi-
dent Harry Truman stated, "we must make certain, by your work here,
that another war will be impossible .... We still have a choice between
the alternatives: the continuation of international chaos, or the establish-
ment of a world organization for the Enforcement of Peace."7 9 The
drafters recognized that the provision in the Charter for collective police
action provided "the teeth of the United Nations" and made the new
world order possible.80
It is inconsistent with this intent to create a new world order-one
in which peace would be secured by collective police actions-to allow
nations to freely invoke Article 51 to justify independent action after the
Security Council has determined what measures are necessary to end the
conflict. According to Professor Franck, Article 51's purpose is to allow
only a very limited right of self-defense:
If states use armed force under the self-defense rubric of Article 51,
their individual activities are subsumed by, or incorporated into, the
global police response once it is activated. That is, the old way is li-
censed only until the new way begins to work: 'until,' in the words of
Article 51, 'the Security Council has taken the necessary measures to
maintain international peace and security.' 81
An unlimited right of self-defense therefore does not comport with the
envisioned new world order following World War II.82
2. The Purpose of Article 51
The purpose of Article 51 illuminates the drafters' intent to carve
78. The letter of Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. to President Roosevelt exempli-
fies the intent of the drafters to reshape the world order:
If we are earnestly determined, as I believe we are, that the innumerable dead of two
great holocausts shall not have died in vain, we must act in concert with the other
nations of the world to bring about the peace for which these dead gave up their lives,
The Charter of the United Nations is the product of such concerted action. Its pur-
pose is the maintenance of peace. It offers means for the achievement of that pur-
pose.... [T]he Charter... offers the world an instrument by which a real beginning
may be made upon the work of peace.
Id. at 19.
79. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE, supra note 10, at 19.
80. U.N. CHARTER art. 42; REPORT, supra note 14, at 88; Franck & Patel, supra note 17,
at 65.
81. Franck & Patel, supra note 17, at 63.
82. Professor Franck states: "It is obvious on its face that the Charter, in creating the new
police power, intended to establish an exclusive alternative to the old war system, The old
system was retained only as a fallback, available when the new system could not be made to
work, not as some... argue, as an equal alternative, to be chosen at the sole discretion of the
members." Id. at 4.
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out only a narrow exception to the prohibition of force. There was no
mention of the right of self-defense in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.8 3
Article 51 was submitted at the San Francisco Conference as an amend-
ment by the Big Four Powers and accepted by other delegations."
The purpose of Article 51 was to legitimize mutual defense agree-
ments. The 1945 Act of Chapultepec was the defense agreement of great-
est significance to the drafting of Article 51. The Act was a collective
defense pact between the United States and Latin American nations dur-
ing World War II. It also called for a permanent mutual defense treaty
after the war.85 The signatories of the Act wanted the United Nations
Charter to legitimize the long-established inter-American mutual defense
system, which began with the Monroe Doctrine and the Good Neighbor
Policy. 6 Article 51 also safeguarded several European alliances that
were established during the war, as well as the Arab League which was
established in 1945.87 Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius,
Jr., wrote in 1945 that Articles 51 through 54 were designed to coordi-
nate the functions of regional agreements with those of the United Na-
tions and "at the same time establish the final authority of the latter."88
3. The Drafting of Article 51
The three principal drafts of Article 51 reflect the intent of the rep-
resentatives at the San Francisco Conference to legitimize mutual defense
agreements, not to authorize independent action. The first draft was sub-
mitted by the United States delegation. It acknowledged the right to self-
defense and collective security arrangements, referring specifically to the
Act of Chapultepec. It read as follows:
Should the Security Council not succeed in preventing aggression, and
should aggression occur by any state against any member state, such
member state possesses the inherent right to take necessary measures
for self-defense. The right to take such measures for self-defense
against armed attack shall also apply to understandings or arrange-
ments like those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all
members of a group of states agree to consider an attack against any
one of them as an attack against all of them .... 89
83. REPORT, supra note 14, at 102-04, 202-03.
84. Id at 104.
85. Act of Chapultepec, 12 DEP'T ST. BULL. 339 (Mar. 3. 1945); see generally RUSSELL,
supra note 12, at 688-712.
86. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 9, 175-76, 179-80; REPORT, supra note 14, at 107.
87. REPORT, supra note 14, at 101.
88. Id at 102.
89. RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 698.
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The draft also required self-defensive actions to be immediately reported
to the Security Council.9" Self-defensive actions were not to affect the
authority of the Security Council "to take at any time such action as it
may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security."'"
The British and Soviet representatives, concerned that the Article
would lead to a series of regional organizations which would act indepen-
dently of the United Nations, objected to the United States draft.92 The
United States replied that the draft's wording did not give regional orga-
nizations general freedom of action because it permitted self-defense only
against armed attack; the draft did not allow unauthorized enforcement
undertakings.93
The British delegation then offered a revised version of the draft,
deleting the reference to the Act of Chapultepec, but retaining the princi-
ples of individual and collective self-defense. The delegation suggested
the following revision: "Nothing in this Charter should invalidate the
right of self-defense against armed attack, either individual or collective,
in the event of the Security Council failing to take the necessary steps to
maintain or restore international peace and security." '94 Like the previ-
ous draft, the revised draft required that measures taken in self-defense
be immediately reported to the Security Council. 95 The revision also
stated that self-defensive measures did not affect the responsibility of the
Security Council to take any action it deemed necessary. 96
The United States found the British text acceptable but still desired
a specific reference to the Act of Chapultepec. 97 The Latin American
nations at the San Francisco Conference objected to the British draft be-
cause they feared that "the Security Council might later declare the in-
ter-American system inconsistent with the Charter."' The impasse was
resolved when the United States promised the Latin American delega-
tions that it would use its veto power to prevent any Security Council
attempt to invalidate the inter-American system and, in addition, agreed
to support other proposals put forth by the Latin American nations.99
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 699.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 700.
99. Id.
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Following this agreement on the wording of Article 51, the United
States took the unusual step of issuing a press release about the Article in
order to underscore its commitment to the inter-American system.1 °
The statement declared that Article 51 "recognized the inherent right of
self-defense but left unaffected the ultimate authority of the Security
Council as the paramount organ in world enforcement action.", 1
For purposes of clarification, the text of the Article was changed
from "in the event of the Security Council failing to take necessary steps
to maintain" to "until the Security Council has taken the measures nec-
essary."10 2 There was concern that the phrase, "failing to take," could
have been narrowly interpreted to mean that the right of self-defense
could not be exercised until after the Security Council had considered
acting and had failed to act.103
After the San Francisco Conference, Secretary of State Stettinius re-
ported to President Roosevelt on the Charter. He explained that Article
51 allowed collective defense agreements to be established consistently
with the Charter."° The Secretary expressed his opinion of the purpose
of the Article, in the context of the entire Charter, as follows:
In thus recognizing the paramount authority of the world organization
in enforcement action as well as the inherent right of self-defense
against armed attack pending the time when the Security Council un-
dertakes such action, this Article... makes possible a useful and effec-
tive integration of regional systems of cooperation with the world
system of international security.10 5
Thus, it is clear that the purpose of Article 51 was to legitimize mutual
defense agreements, not to authorize independent action.
C. The Policy Ramifications of Alternate Interpretations
Several policy considerations support the view that Article 51
should be read to limit the right of self-defense to situations in which the
Security Council has not yet determined the measures necessary to re-
store peace.
1. The Future of the United Nations
If the United Nations is to be the forum for peace in the 1990s and
100. REPORT, supra note 14, at 108; RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 701-02.
101. RUSSELL, supra note 12, at 701-02.
102. Id at 703, n.18 (emphasis added).
103. Id
104. REPORT, supra note 14, at 108.
105. Id at 107.
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beyond, its evolution must be nurtured today. The United Nations will
be severely weakened in the long-term if nations such as the United
States and Great Britain jump to the defense of invaded nations, circum-
venting or ignoring the Security Council. Professor Chayes reasons that
"[i]f the Security Council is to be preserved and strengthened for the role
it was designed to play, ... it must exercise genuine powers of decision,
which means that [its decisions] ... must be accepted even by states that
do not agree." 106 While garnering United Nations support for the use of
force against Iraq, the United States echoed Chayes' viewpoint. Secre-
tary of State James Baker told the Security Council that the debate on
the use of force will "rank as one of the most important in the history of
the United Nations. It will surely do much to determine the future of
this body."10
7
Professor Christopher Joyner of George Washington University
points out that independent actions affect not only the development of
the United Nations, but also the development of norms of behavior in
international law.'0 8 He argues that unilateral or even group-sanctioned
military intervention radically detracts from the viability of international
law.'0 9 Professor Joyner's analysis of the United States invasion of Gre-
nada in October 1983 is instructive to the interpretation of Article 51.
He wrote: "That the ends attained [in Grenada] were good and just is
laudable; the means used to fulfill that ambition, however, emerge as le-
gally regrettable."' 10 In other words, the ends do not justify the means if
the ultimate outcome of the action is destruction of the United Nations
and international behavioral norms. In the long-term, international law
and the mechanisms of the United Nations will best serve those nations
which adhere to the law and Charter in every short-term decision.III
Moreover, in the early 1990s, there is unprecedented world support
for utilizing the Security Council as the forum for the resolution of inter-
national conflict. Most nations, small and large, chose the United Na-
tions and the Security Council as the forum for pressing Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait. This support should not be wasted. In Presi-
dent Bush's words: "The civilized world is now in the process of fashion-
ing the rules that will govern the new world order beginning to emerge in
106. Chayes, supra note 66, at 16.
107. Excerpts From U.S., Kuwaiti, Iraqi and Chinese Remarks on the Resolution, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1990, at A10.
108. Joyner, supra note 42, at 143-44.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 144.
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the aftermath of the Cold War.""' 2 This new world order must be al-
lowed to take shape.
2. The Protection of Invaded Nations
Reliance on independent action in the name of self-defense and the
circumvention of the Security Council will not protect all invaded na-
tions equally. Furthermore, unequal treatment of nations undermines
the United Nations credibility. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait produced a
unique fusion of principle and interest." 3 But what if the next time one
nation invades a neighbor, the United States interest is not so signifi-
cantly engaged?
Only the United Nations can ensure that all invaded nations are
equally defended. For example, what if one African country invades an-
other?114 Would the United States have enough at stake to leap to the
invaded nation's defense? Or what if Pakistan takes territory along its
disputed border with Kashmir, India?" 5 The Chinese or the Soviets
might be interested, but the United States might not be willing to commit
troops in defense of India. If the invaded nations in these scenarios are to
be protected under the new world order, the Security Council must be
112. George Bush, Why We Are in the Gulf, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 1990, at 28-29.
113. Fred Strasser, Iraq Clash Tests New Alliances, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 3, 1990, at I (quoting
Allan Gerson, the legal counsel to the U.S. delegation at the United Nations from 1981 to
1986).
114. It is not difficult to imagine an invasion of a sizable scale growing out of one of the
many hot spots in Africa today. For instance, in October 1990, a senior Ugandan army officer
led an invading force into neighboring Rwanda. The Ugandan government condemned the
invasion whose troops consisted of Rwandan refugees. Thousands Invade, Rwanda Reports,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1990, at A21. Nonetheless, the President of Uganda was accused of
"complicity in yet another African civil war." Jane Perlez, Old Troubles and New Vex Top
Ugandan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1991, at A4.
As another illustration, the civil war in Liberia, which began in early 1990, threatens to
draw in forces from neighboring countries. A five-country force (Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea,
Gambia, and Sierra Leone) was assembled to try to halt the war, but many Liberians were
concerned that these nations would side with the existing government. An American official
called this an "explosive situation" because Liberia's neighbors appeared to be taking sides in
the conflict. Kenneth B. Noble, Civil War in Liberia Threatening To Divide West African
Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1990, at Al. See also Kenneth B. Noble, The Once-Mighty
Cast Out: Liberia's Fallen Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1991, at A4 (discussing refugees from
Liberia who have fled to neighboring countries).
115. The border between Indian Kashmir and Pakistan, formally known as the "line of
control," has been disputed for more than four decades. The dispute flared into full-scale
conflicts in 1947, 1965 and 1971. Skirmishes continued in 1990. The local population along
the mountainous border strongly supports the Kashmiris' independence revolt and views Paki-
stan as the movement's only international friend. Barbara Crossette, In Torn Kashmir. Fron-
tier Is Aflame Once More, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1990, at A4. See also Edward A. Gargan,
Behind Its Mountain Walls, Kashmir Wages Vicious War, N.Y TIME, Oct. 28, 1991, at Al.
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the locus of the decision of whether and how to use force to repel an
invasion. Then, in Secretary of State Baker's words, "it is important that
resolutions and actions be implemented."' 6
The design of the Security Council diminishes the possibility that
invaded nations will be treated unequally. In 1965, a change in the seat-
ing rules in the Security Council remedied the concern of some develop-
ing nations that the Council could be selective in punishing aggressors.
Developing nations now hold seven of the fifteen Council seats.1 17 Since
nine votes are needed for approval of any resolution, at least two devel-
oping nations must concur."1 Similarly, if developing nations feel that
their interests are threatened, two votes can serve as a veto.119 Thus,
assuming that the Security Council is functioning (i.e., not deadlocked),
the equality of defense is far more certain in the Security Council than if
it is left to one nation's judgment of whether collective self-defensive ac-
tion is warranted.1 20
3. The World's View of a Nation Taking Independent Action
Any nation, such as the United States or Great Britain, that has an
interest in assisting in the defense of an invaded country will fare better
in world opinion if it encourages United Nations action rather than tak-
ing independent action. For example, soon after Iraq invaded Kuwait,
Paul Lewis of The New York Times noted that while the task of persuad-
ing the Security Council to authorize the use of force would not be easy,
unilateral action by the United States would likely deal a terrible blow to
the international consensus opposing Iraq.1 21 Similarly, after the United
States nearly doubled the number of troops in the Persian Gulf in No-
116. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Not Just the Gulf, but the Globe, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1990, at
A15 (Secretary of State James Baker told the Washington Post when he prepared the resolution
authorizing force: "It's very important that when the United Nations takes actions - passes
resolutions and takes actions - that those resolutions and actions be implemented.").
117. Article 23 of the United Nations Charter, concerning the Composition of the Security
Council, was amended on December 17, 1963 by the General Assembly. The number of non-
permanent members was increased from six to ten. The amendment came into force on Au-
gust 31, 1965. EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 11, at 434; Lucia Mouat, Reaction
to Gulf Crisis Displays UN's Enhanced Security Role, CHRISTIAN Sd. MONITOR, Dec. 5, 1990,
at 1.
118. Mouat, supra note 117, at 1.
119. Id.
120. If the Security Council is deadlocked because of the exercise of a veto, then the exer-
cise of collective self-defense may be permissible. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying
text.
121. Paul Lewis, U.N., As Well, Is Entering the Post-Cold-War Era, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1990, at A13.
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vember 1990, Anthony Lewis of The New York Times reasoned that
political reality militated against independent action:
The legal argument [that the right of self-defense under Article 51 no
longer exists] is in accord with the political reality. The Bush Admin-
istration went to the United Nations because it wanted the broadest
possible coalition against Iraq. If it acted unilaterally now, it would
destroy the hard-won consensus. 12
Joseph J. Sisco, a career diplomat, noted that if the United States used
the United Nations framework after the Iraqi invasion, it would have the
advantage of "diffusing the dominant visibility of the United States" and
shield the United States "against charges of unilateralism."'I
In the fall of 1990, Neil Kinnock, the British Labor Party leader,
warned that independent action against Iraq would destroy international
solidarity and lead to further turmoil in the Middle East. "These are the
reasons why it is important strategically that everything possible is done
to ensure that if further military action is necessary, it should be taken
under the full authority of the United Nations."' 24
The backlash against the United States invasion of Grenada on Oc-
tober 25, 1983, is also instructive with regard to world opinion. A large
majority of the countries taking part in the Security Council debate criti-
cized the invasion. A resolution was drafted which condemned the "fla-
grant violation of international law" and called for the immediate
withdrawal of foreign troops.125
4. The Cost to Nations Taking Independent Action
In addition to the political costs of independent action, there are
also high monetary costs. The cost burden will be distributed more equi-
tably and efficiently to all nations if action is undertaken by the United
Nations rather than by individual nations. 26
In order to sustain the American force in the Persian Gulf, the Bush
administration announced a "burden-sharing plan" on August 31,
1990.127 The United States sought long-term monetary commitments
122. Anthony Lewis, supra note 55, at A19.
123. Joseph J. Sisco, Next Move at the U.N., WASH. POST, Aug. 15 1990, at A21.
124. Glenn Frankel, British GulfRole Wins Broad Backing, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1990, at
A25 (quoting Neil Kinnock).
125. The resolution was vetoed by the United States on October 28, 1983. EVERYONE'S
UNrrED NATIONS, supra note 11, at 43.
126. This argument holds true whether United Nations action is taken by a United Nations
force under the Military Staff committee or by a coalition with U.S. support.
127. On August 31, 1990, President Bush announced: "We are more than ready to bear our
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from West Germany, Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, and the exiled government of Kuwait.'28 By late Sep-
tember 1990, Secretary of State James Baker and Secretary of Treasury
Nicholas Brady had travelled the globe collecting pledges of more than
twenty billion dollars.'29 By the end of January 1991, when the war was
estimated to cost 600 million dollars a day, Secretary of State Baker was
again gathering pledges from the Saudis, the exiled Kuwaiti government,
and Japan." 0 Not only is it more equitable to have the burden of ex-
penses distributed through the United Nations, but from the United
States perspective, reimbursement through the United Nations is clearly
preferable to dependence on a Secretary of State's diplomacy.
5. Drawbacks to the Interpretation Which Limits the Right of
Self-Defense and Rebuttals
Several pragmatic reasons have been put forth as to why a nation
such as the United States or Great Britain would not want to adopt the
interpretation which limits the right of self-defense. Further examina-
tion, however, reveals that these reasons are inconsequential.
The foremost concern is that a nation loses military flexibility if it
accedes to the will of the Security Council. With respect to the resolu-
tions against Iraq in the fall of 1990, former United Nations Ambassador
Jeanne Kirkpatrick noted that the power to ensure the passage or failure
of the resolutions lay with Columbia, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, the
Ivory Coast, Cuba, Romania, and Zaire.13 1 Kirkpat:rick felt that "[ihere
fair share of the burden, and we also expect others to bear their fair share." Clifford Krauss,
In Tallying Its GulfCosts, U.S. Counts Impatience, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1990, at Al 1.
128. Id.
129. Thomas L. Friedman, Running the Gulf Coalition Is Trieky Business, N.Y. TImES,
Sept. 23, 1990, at El.
The United States persuaded many nations to pledge money. The funds were earmarked
to support either the United States troop build up or the Middle Eastern nations adversely
affected by the crisis. In September 1990 the largest monetary commitments included: approxi-
mately twelve million dollars from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf States; four billion
dollars from Japan; two billion dollars from the European Community; and $1.87 billion from
West Germany. Supporting the U.S. in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1990, at A12.
130. In January 1991, the Saudis pledged $13.5 billion to the United States for the first
three months of 1991. The overthrown government of Kuwait also pledged $13.5 billion, and
Japan pledged nine billion dollars. Saudis Pledge $13.5 Billion To Help Pay for War in Gulf,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 27, 1991, at A16.
131. Kirkpatrick, supra note 116, at A15. Kirkpatrick reasoned that the five permanent
members plus Canada are involved in the Gulf crisis because of their stature in world affairs.
She also notes that North Yemen has a large stake because it is a neighbor in the Gulf region,
Thus, the remaining eight countries who sit on the Security Council have "the power to decide
the outcome even though they have no special knowledge of the countries or the regions and
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is something intrinsically unreasonable about the United States or the
United Kingdom or the Saudis or the Egyptians asking permission of
Finland or Zaire to spend lives and money driving back Saddam's
forces." '132 For the United Nations to function, however, nations must
surrender some degree of national sovereignty.
This surrender of sovereignty is not necessarily undesirable. Rather,
it is the price that nations must pay for the new world order. The United
States representatives at the San Francisco Conference recognized that
joining the United Nations system would entail "some limitation on our
freedom of action," but they stated that the limitation "must be weighed
against what it is designed to prevent - the appalling cost in men and
material wealth of another war."' 33 Moreover, the representatives noted
that the United States would still have a large measure of control as a
permanent member of the Security Council. 134 Both of these points are
as valid today as they were in 1945.131
There is also concern that putting troops and armaments under the
United Nations flag and under the direction of the Military Staff Com-
mittee is unwise. The Charter contemplates the negotiation of agree-
ments for the provision of armed forces, assistance, and facilities so that
the United Nations itself would have the ability to take measures.1 36 The
Charter also calls for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee "to
advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the
Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security."' 37 The placement of United States troops and
no special stake in that outcome. Since they will risk neither lives nor money in this conflict,
they are good examples of representation without taxation." Id.
132. Id.
133. REPORT, supra note 14, at 88.
134. Id
135. See, eg., an analysis in The New York Times:
America may have sent planes, tanks and marines to the Gulf, but others have pro-
vided the funds or political cover for their use, which means they cannot be used at
will. Some might argue that this is precisely the meaning of, and a small price for,
real collective security as envisioned by the United Nations' founders.
Friedman, supra note 129, at Al.
136. U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
137. Id. art. 47, 1.
The Military Staff Committee is to be comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council. Id art. 47, 2.
The drafters of the Charter also envisioned that special military agreements would be
made. Then, military forces were to be immediately available for possible call by the Security
Council in the event of a breach of the peace. Id art. 43; REviEw, supra note 31, at 195. The
Military Staff Committee was to have responsibility for the strategic direction of armed forces
should any ever be made available for use under these agreements. Id.
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technology under control of another entity could create not only a mili-
tary command problem, but a political problem as well.1 38 No powerful
nation wants its troops serving under another country's flag. 139 These
concerns explain to a certain extent why the special agreements and the
Military Staff Committee have never been implemented as envisioned in
the Charter. 14
Military action that is authorized by the United Nations, however,
can be controlled by the nations whose troops are fighting with no harm-
ful effects. This is how the Korean War was waged.1 41 Similarly, the
coalition forces in the Gulf War were commanded principally by the
United States. 142 There is nothing wrong with the organic evolution of
138. See, eg., John M. Goshko, Baker Begins Round of Gulf Consultations U.S. Seeks
Views of U.N. Council Members, WASH. PosT, Nov. 16, 1990, at A21.
139. Frank J. Prial, Crisis Breathes Life Into a Moribund UN. Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1990, at A20.
140. Stein, supra note 18, at 307.
The Military Staff Committee met several times in the fall of 1990 at the urging of the
Soviet Union. Paul Lewis, Security Council's Military Panel Reviews Naval Efforts to Enforce
Trade Embargo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1990, at All; Prial, supra note 139, at A20.
141. When North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950, the Security Council passed a reso-
lution urging members to furnish "such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be neccs-
sary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."
Citing this authorization, President Truman sent U.S. forces to Korea. Later, the Security
Council adopted a resolution recommending that members make military forces and other
assistance available to "a unified command under the United States." Anthony Goodman,
Korea Recalled as U.S. Considers Asking U.N. to Approve Force, The Reuter News Report,
Nov. 29, 1990, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
Joseph J. Sisco, a career diplomat and an Undersecretary of State from 1974-76 called
these resolutions "largely an after-the-fact legalization of U.S. military action." Sisco, supra
note 123, at A21.
142. By the January 15, 1991 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, the United
States had clearly established its leadership of the coalition against Iraq.
Initially, coalition politics muddied the lines of authority that General Schwarzkopf
was seeking to insure a linear command structure under his direct authority. But
Pentagon officials maintain that by the time the battle began, General Powell had
structured the war planning in a way that has made the necessary political conces-
sions to integrating both Arab and Western allies, while at the same time giving
General Schwarzkopf the authority he needed.
Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. War Plan: Still the Ground to Conquer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, at
Al.
The American-led coalition to defend Saudi Arabia and drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait
included troops and/or equipment from the following nations: Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Nether-
lands, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, Spain, Turkey, and United Arab
Emirates. Supporting the U.S. in the Gulf, supra note 129, at A12. Aircraft from the following
nations was involved in the "air war" against Iraq: Canada, France, Great Britain, Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The Balance of Power in the Air: Who Has What, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at A15.
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the means for undertaking a collective police action, so long as it does
not hamper the functioning of the Security Council in the manner in-
tended by the framers. 143
The language of the text, the intent of the drafters, and the policy
ramifications of alternate interpretations weigh strongly on the side of a
limited right of self-defense. Under Article 51, once the Security Council
takes the action which it determines is necessary, a nation can no longer
independently use force by invoking the right of self-defense. In an apt
analogy, Senator Sam Nunn declared: "You can't round up the posse and
then act like the Lone Ranger." 1"
I. CONCLUSION
The United Nations is being heralded as the forum for international
dispute resolution, but the United States, Great Britain, and other na-
tions only now are realizing the extent of the constraints in the United
Nations system. The constraints go beyond the politics of maintaining
the support of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Ar-
ticle 51 is a constraint which is built into the Charter. Article 51 should
not be used to legitimize independent action to resolve a conflict after the
Security Council has taken whatever action it deems necessary to resolve
that conflict.
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Security Council's ultimate
approval of naval interdiction did not vindicate the United States disre-
gard for the correct reading of Article 51.111 Moreover, in waiting for
Security Council authorization of the use of force against Iraq, the
United States did the right thing for the wrong reason. The United
States heeded the political mandate, not the Charter mandate.
Since the Iraqi invasion, the change in world order has accelerated.
The time may soon be at hand when one nation invades another and the
United Nations mechanisms for restoring peace will again be tested. The
right of self-defense may be exercised legitimately only before the United
Nations mechanisms begin to churn - that is, before the Security Coun-
cil takes the measures that it determines are necessary. Independent ac-
tion under the guise of Article 51 is not consistent with the United
Nations Charter and the new world order.
143. Cf Franck & Patel, supra note 17, at 70-72 (The Korean War demonstrated how the
United Nations system could evolve organically).
144. Anthony Day, U.S. Cozies Up To Law of Nations, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 27. 1990, at Al.
145. The United States is not free to ignore Article 51 because the supremacy clause of
article VI of the United States Constitution states that all treaties "shall be the supreme law of
the land." Paul Savoy, Peacekeepersfor the Gulf, THE NATION, Nov. 26, 1990, at 642.
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